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The authors reporton the results of a survey 
they conducted to discover the profession's 
reaction to the Equity Funding case.
Dr. Kerry Cooper
College Station, Texas
More than three years have passed since 
the American business community was 
rocked by the revelations of massive, 
management-perpetrated fraud in the 
Equity Funding Corporation. As soon as 
the dimensions of the fraud became 
known, it was apparent that its repercus­
sions would be widespread and dramatic, 
especially for the accounting profession. 
This article assesses the reaction of the 
accounting profession to the fraud over 
the past three years. An analysis of the 
official AICPA response (the report of the 
Special Committee on Equity Funding) 
and the results of a survey of accounting 
firms is included. Initially, however, it is 
perhaps helpful to offer a brief description 
of the fraud at Equity Funding.
The Equity Funding Case
The Equity Funding Corporation of 
America was formed in the early 1960s. Its 
operations focused on a marketing pro­
gram involving life insurance policies and 
mutual fund shares in a rather unique 
investment package. This plan involved 
the sale by Equity Funding of mutual fund 
shares which were then pledged as collat­
eral by the buyer for loans to buy term life 
insurance. The major selling point was 
that it permitted individuals to invest in 
mutual funds and receive life insurance as 
an added benefit. The firm grew rapidly, 
acquiring mutual funds, insurance com­
panies, and a reputation for shrewd, ag­
gressive management. From a price of $6 a 
share in 1964, the company's stock soared 
to a 1969 high of $80 a share.
The apparent profitability of the firm's 
operations was, however, a sham almost 
from the beginning. The installment na­
ture of the mutual fund share sales caused 
Equity Funding to be perennially starved 
for cash. This pressing need for cash 
obliged the company to heavily reinsure 
new business — a practice which involves 
the sale of a life insurance policy to 
another company. Under a reinsuring ar­
rangement, the issuing company con­
tinues to service the policy and to collect 
the customer's premium payment, of 
which about 90% is remitted to the rein­
surer.
The practice of reinsuring was not un­
usual in the life insurance industry. Equity 
Funding, however, gave a new twist to the 
practice. It sold phony policies (which 
were altered versions of real ones) in order 
to obtain needed cash. On Equity's rec­
ords, the sham policies were scattered 
throughout its magnetic tape files but 
were linked together by secret code num­
bers. The latter feature permitted these 
policies to be excluded from selected 
printouts by the use of computer pro­
grams designed specifically for this pur­
pose — a useful measure for deceiving 
auditors.
The sale of bogus life insurance policies 
and the corresponding manipulation of 
the books were the predominant features 
of the fraud. Other fraudulent activities 
were carried out, however, including the 
borrowing of cash without recording the 
liability, the booking of nonexistent secu­
rities investments, and the inflation of the 
existent asset values.
The fraud was exposed in early 1973 as 
the result of telephone calls from a former 
Equity Funding employee to the New 
York State Department of Insurance and 
to Raymond Dirks, a financial analyst in 
New York. The Department of Insurance 
referred the matter to the insurance regu­
latory authorities in Illinois and California 
where Equity Funding Life Insurance and 
the parent company, respectively, were 
chartered. The official investigation 
launched by these agencies and the unof­
ficial one launched by Dirks triggered 
rumors that something was amiss with 
Equity Funding. Trading volume in Equity 
shares rose from a normal 14,000 shares a 
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day to 768,000 shares on March 26, the last 
day of trading before the SEC suspended 
trading in all Equity Funding securities in 
all markets. The price per share dropped 
from 27¼ on March 15 to 14⅜ on March 
26.
The SEC filed suit in federal district 
court against Equity Funding, charging 
fraud and violation of federal securities 
laws. Under court order, the firm filed a 
petition for protection under Chapter 10 of 
the Federal Bankruptcy Act, and a court- 
appointed trustee took control of Equity 
Funding. The court also appointed 
Touche Ross & Co. to perform a fraud 
audit. Touche Ross issued an audit report 
for Equity Funding in February 1974. The 
report indicated that net assets were over­
stated by $185 million, including more 
than $62 million of bogus insurance 
policies.
Report of the AICPA Special 
Committee on Equity Funding 
Other than company employees and 
executives, there were primarily five 
groups affected in varying degrees by the 
Equity Funding fraud. These groups in­
cluded the life insurance policyholders, 
the insurance industry, financial analysts, 
investors in Equity Funding, and inde­
pendent certified public accountants. The 
ultimate impact on the last group is 
perhaps the most difficult to project.
The fact that Equity's auditors had failed 
to discover the fraud became an im­
mediate object of media attention and 
raised questions regarding the effective­
ness of current audit standards and pro­
cedures and auditor responsibility for the 
detection of management fraud. In May 
1973 the AICPA appointed a special com­
mittee to study whether or not the Equity 
Funding case indicated a need for change 
in auditing standards.
The special committee's report was re­
leased to the public in June, 1975.1 The 
committee concluded that the proper ap­
plication of customary audit procedures 
would probably have resulted in the de­
tection of the existence of fraud at Equity 
Funding. The committee recommended 
only minor changes in auditing proce­
dures (relating to confirmation of insur­
ance policies and treatment of related- 
party transactions) and no changes in 
auditing standards.
The committee carefully attempted to 
draw these conclusions without attribut­
ing fault to the Equity Funding auditors. 
(This was not merely a matter of profes­
sional courtesy. Although the criminal 
cases involving Equity's auditors were 
complete and the guilty verdicts rendered 
at the time of the release of the committee 
report, a great deal of civil litigation was 
still pending.) The committee argued 
against the enlargement of auditor re­
sponsibility for fraud detection on the 
grounds that the benefits were not com­
mensurate with the costs.
Reaction to Equity Funding Case: 
Survey Results
While the report on the Special Committee 
on Equity Funding constitutes an official 
response to this fraud case, it is also of 
interest to assess the reactions of indi­
vidual CPAs. In an attempt to gain some 
insight regarding such reaction, a survey 
of 500 public accounting firms and indi­
vidual practitioners was conducted. The 
mailing list for the questionnaire was ran­
domly selected from Accounting Firms and 
Practitioners which contains member firms 
by state and city.2 The survey resulted in 
105 usable responses. Represented among 
the respondents were 77 local, 13 regional, 
and 15 national and international firms.
The firms were queried in regard to only 
one aspect of possible reaction to the 
Equity Funding fraud. However, it is the 
most crucial aspect — whether or not any 
changes in the auditing approach em­
ployed for computer-based accounting 
systems had been implemented as a result 
of the disclosures regarding Equity Fund­
ing. Table 1 indicates the cumulative re­
sponses of all the firms and of local, 
regional, and national and international 
firms, respectively.
Respondent reactions to the Equity 
Funding case were analyzed according to 
the size of geographical area served by 
each firm. It is likely that these reactions 
represent somewhat tentative attitudes 
about a situation that most certainly will 
be subjected to additional scrutiny and 
action by certified public accounting firms. 
However, from the analysis of these initial 
responses, it appears that the national and 
international firms took a more formal 
approach while the local and regional 
(Continued on pg. 18)
Table 1 
REACTION TO THE EQUITY FUNDING CASE
Has your firm made any changes in its policy toward auditing financial statements produced in a computer-based accounting system as 
a result of the alleged insurance fraud case involving the Equity Funding Corporation of America?
Have not heard of case..............................................................
No, we are awaiting final outcome of pending litigation 
before further action is taken........................................
Yes, to the extent of informal suggestions and 
comments exchanged by firm personnel...................
Yes, a committee has been established to study the 
audit implications but no recommendations 
have been made ................................................................
Yes, formal changes have been made and implemented














6% 8% 7% 7%
21 30 27 23
42 54 27 42
1 0 20 4
3 0 7 3
9 8 6 8
18 0 6 13
100% 100% 100% 100%
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the user, is the technique of data encryp­
tion. Cryptography represents a trans­
formation of data which makes it unread­
able to a person who does not have access 
to the cryptographic key. This technique 
deals with the problem of limiting access 
by unauthorized users. It also deals with 
the problem of electromagnetic eaves­
dropping.
Additional provisions for data security 
represent potentially a significant increase 
in the cost of information systems. One 
estimate suggested that the additional 
data which would have to be collected to 
provide a complete history of all accesses 
to data files and additions for unambigu­
ous identification of individuals would 
increase the size of existing files by 10% a 
year. The increase in file sizes for these 
identification records and the additional 
checking procedures implemented in 
software and hardware features represent 
a price which will have to be paid in 
increased processing time for each file 
access. The costs of increasing individual 
privacy should be considered as carefully 
as the conditions to be imposed in insur­
ing that privacy.
Social Security Numbers 
as Universal Identifiers
Adoption of a single standard identifica­
tion system for all individuals would make 
data-gathering, data storage, and data 
retrieval more efficient. It would also 
facilitate the exchange of information be­
tween computer systems and data files. 
For that reason there have been several 
proposals to establish standard universal 
identifying numbering system. Further, 
the suggestion has frequently been made 
that this universal identification number­
ing system should be the social security 
numbers.
One objection to the adoption of such a 
universal identifier rests with the concept 
of a common identification scheme. Many 
object to the potential for abuse and exces­
sive control which such a standard iden­
tification number could have. Apart from 
such a consideration, however, use of the 
social security number itself has several 
weaknesses as a universal identifier 
should that concept find acceptance.
Social security numbers as they cur­
rently exist incorporate no self-checking 
features which would make it possible to 
distinguish any randomly chosen nine­
digit number from a valid social security 
number. Further as early as 1973, the 
Social Security Administration estimated 
that more than 4.2 million people had two 
or more social security numbers.
The Privacy Act of 1974, in section 7, 
provides:
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(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Fed­
eral, State, or local government agency 
to deny to any individual any right, 
benefit, or privilege provided by law 
because of such individual's refusal to 
disclose his social security account 
number.
(2) the provisions of paragraph (1) of 
this subsection shall not apply with 
respect to —
(A) any disclosure which is required 
by Federal statute, or
(B) the disclosure of a social security 
number to any Federal, state, or 
local agency maintaining a system of 
records in existence and operating 
before January 1, 1975, if such dis­
closure was required under statute 
or regulation adopted prior to such 
date to verify the identity of an 
individual.
(b) Any Federal, state, or local govern­
ment agency which requests an indi­
vidual to disclose his social security 
account number shall inform that indi­
vidual whether that disclosure is man­
datory or voluntary, by what statutory 
or other authority such number is so­
licited, and what uses will be made of 
it.
Implications for the Future
With the continued expansion of com­
puterized information systems, the con­
cern with individual privacy and the re­
lated requirements for data accuracy, con­
fidentiality, and security are likely to in­
crease. The Privacy Act of 1974 will not be 
the final legislation in that area. 
Additional federal action (HR 1984) deal­
ing with privacy and data security con­
cerns within individual states and in the 
private sector is already under considera­
tion.
Soon the privacy regulations will extend 
to the many thousands of installations 
operated by business and other sectors of 
society besides Federal agencies. In addi­
tion, many states are also actively study­
ing legislation dealing with protection of 
individual privacy implications in com­
puter data banks.
This heightened concern at both the 
Federal and state level gives promise that 
adequate attention will be focused on the 
potential abuses of such data systems. At 
the same time, it is essential that we 
manage to develop some consensus be­
tween the federal and state agencies and 
the private sector services on the appro­
priate levels of regulation and the 
standard security procedures to be im­
plemented. Without this consensus we 
could be faced with the development of 
numerous and conflicting regulations by 
the many legal jurisdictions currently in­
volved. Such duplication and conflict 
would severely limit the usefulness of 
these data systems and dramatically raise 
their cost.
Equity Funding
(Continued from pg. 12)
firms reacted to the case in a more informal 
manner. About half of the local and re­
gional firms stated that their firm's reac­
tions to Equity Funding disclosures were 
limited to informal comments among firm 
personnel. About one-fourth of the na­
tional and international firms, on the other 
hand, had a much larger frequency of 
instances in which they established a 
committee of firm personnel in order to 
study the audit implications of the Equity 
Funding fraud. One-fifth of the national 
and international firms, compared to al­
most none of the local or regional firms, 
stated that they had formed such commit­
tees.
Few of the respondents indicated any 
formal changes in audit policies and pro­
cedures for computer-based accounting 
systems as a result of the Equity Funding 
case disclosures, regardless of the size of 
the firm surveyed. Only three percent of 
the local firms and seven percent of the 
national and international firms indicated 
any formal changes.
Summary and Conclusions
The Equity Funding fraud raised serious 
questions about the role of the auditor in 
the American business system. The attest 
function is intended to provide assurance 
to investors that financial information 
concerning firms offering investment se­
curities is a fair representation (in accor­
dance with generally accepted accounting 
principles) of economic realities. Such 
massive fraud cases clearly place this pre­
sumed assurance in jeopardy.
The accounting profession, up to this 
point in time at least, has reacted cau­
tiously and deliberately, but positively, to 
the Equity scandal. Only time will tell if 
the profession's reaction has been an ap­
propriate response.
Notes
1Special Committee on Equity Funding, Re­
port of the Committee, The Adequacy of Auditing 
Standards of Procedures Currently Applied in the 
Examination of Financial Statements (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants, 1975).
2American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants, Accounting Firms and Practitioners: 
1971 (New York: American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 1972). This survey was 
conducted in November, 1973, approximately 
eight months after the Equity Funding fraud 
was disclosed to the public.
